Second Minor Drug Possession Conviction Is Not Aggravated Felony for Immigration Purposes

Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder (U.S. Sup. Ct. 2010)

In this case, the Supreme Court held that for purposes of cancellation of removal, an applicant must actually be convicted of an aggravated felony to be disqualified from seeking such relief.  The case arose because the respondent, a lawful permanent resident, had been convicted in Texas of possessing without prescription of one tablet of Xanax, a common anti-anxiety drug.  He served 10 days jail time for this conviction.  Previously, he had been convicted of possession of less than three ounces of marijuana, for which he served 20 days in jail.  Both convictions are classified as misdemeanors under both Texas and federal law drug laws.  Following his second conviction, the government placed him in removal proceedings.  He sought relief against removal pursuant to cancellation of removal.  The government argued successfully before the immigration judge that the second drug conviction rendered the respondent ineligible for cancellation of removal because he may now be considered an aggravated felon on account of being convicted of two drug possession charges.

Moral Turpitude Watch

Nunez v. Holder (9th Cir. 2010)

The Ninth Circuit ruled that a conviction for indecent exposure pursuant to Cal. Penal Code Sec. 314 is not a crime of moral turpitude.  In a nutshell, the court determined that the wording of Sec. 314 is too broad and encompasses too many types of conduct which may be questionable and tasteless but not necessarily vile or depraved, such as a woman flashing her breasts at a bar, or persons having consensual sex in a bathroom, to be categorically considered a crime of moral turpitude.  Good news, I suppose, for those who have been convicted of indecent exposure.   Although such a conviction won’t render you inadmissible for removable, it still will be extremely embarrassing having to explain your conduct to an immigration official.

Cancellation of Removal Applicant Entitled to Full and Fair Hearing

Cruz Rendon v. Holder (9th Cir. 2010)

In a harsh rebuke to a sitting immigration judge, the 9th Circuit ruled that the judge’s conduct deprived an applicant for cancellation of removal a full, fair, and impartial hearing.

The applicant, Cruz Rendon, was a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States illegally in 1990.  In 2004, the government initiated removal proceedings against her.   She applied for cancellation of removal as her form of discretionary relief.  Her qualifying relative was her four year old son, whom she was raising as a single parent.  Her son suffered from Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).  Cruz Rendon submitted a psychological report which documented her son’s condition.  The report indicated that if he were separated from his mother or forced to relocate to Mexico, the resultant emotional distress would worsen his problems.  To qualify for cancellation of removal, Cruz Rendon had to establish that her son would suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” if she were removed from the U.S.

Immigrations Judges May Require Asylum Applicants to Produce Corroborating Evidence

Singh v. Holder (9th Cir. 2010)

In a dismaying decision which will have long term repercussions in all future asylum hearings, the 9th Circuit ruled that an immigration judge may require an applicant to provide corroborating documentary evidence to support his testimony, even if the applicant was credible.

BIA finds INA Requires No Overt Act to Advance Conspiracy In Order to Be Removable

Matter of Orlando Gracia Richardson (BIA 2010)

In this case, the BIA decided that for purposes of removal pursuant to § 101(a)(43)(U) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U), the term “conspiracy” is not limited to conspiracies that require the co-conspirator to have committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.  The respondent, Richardson, was a citizen of Jamaica who had lawful permanent resident status.  In February 2004, he was convicted in New Jersey of conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of certain New Jersey criminal statutes.  Richardson was sentenced to seven years imprisonment for his crime.  Thereafter, the government placed him in removal proceedings.  The bases for his removal was that he had been convicted of an aggravated felony, a theft offense under § 101(a)(43)(G) of the INA, and conspiracy under § 101(a)(43)(U).

Moral Turpitude Watch

Alvarez-Reynaga v. Holder (9th Cir. 2010)

With one hand the court giveth, with the other the court taketh.  The Ninth Circuit ruled that a conviction pursuant to Cal. Penal Code Sec. 496d(a) for the purchase or receipt of a stolen vehicle is not a crime of moral turpitude.  Spinning on a dime, the court then determined that such a conviction, however, is an aggravated felony for purposes of removability.  It boggles the mind–the respondent in the case was able to practically taste the feeling of relief for about thirty seconds, until he read the next two pages of the court’s decision.  An expression from high school captures the moment best…psych!

Closer to the DREAM?

A few interesting events occurred last week in the immigration legislation world.  First, the Arizona legislature enacted and its governor signed the most draconian anti-immigrant law in the 50 states.  This story has been well covered in many other forums, blogs, and media sources, so I won’t be discussing it much here.  My emphasis is more directed at national immigration issues rather than local ones.  Along that line, the more interesting story to me is that two senators, Dick Durbin (D-IL) and Richard Lugar (R-IN) sent a letter to Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, asking her to stop deportation actions against immigrant students who could qualify for legal status under the DREAM Act.

Criminal Defendants Must Be Advised of Immigration Consequences of Plea Bargain.

Padilla v. Kentucky (U.S. Sup. Ct. 2010) 

The U.S. Supreme Court took on the question as to whether a non-citizen defendant in a criminal case must be be advised by his lawyer beforehand that pleading guilty to certain criminal offenses would result in his being removed from the United States.  The case arose because Jose Padilla, a long term permanent resident (over 40 years), who was a defendant in a criminal drug case, pled guilty to the charges against him based on the incorrect advice of his lawyer.  He was accused of transporting a large quantity of marijuana.  He asked his lawyer what would be the immigration consequences if he pled guilty.  His lawyer told him incorrectly that he had nothing to worry about because he had been in the country for so long.  The reality, however, is that under U.S. immigration laws, a conviction for drug trafficking charges is practically a guaranteed one-way ticket to removal proceedings.  Aside from very limited exceptions, it is mandatory that a person with such a conviction be removed.  By law, immigration courts do not have the discretion to save a convicted drug trafficker from removal.

Religious Conversion Is a Basis for Qualifying for Exception to Rule That Asylum Application Must Be Filed Within One Year.

Taslimi v. Holder (9th Cir. 2010)

Generally, a person seeking political asylum in the United States must file the application within one year of his or her entry into the country.  An application which is filed later than that would be considered time-barred.  Regardless of the merits of the case, such application will likely be denied.  Fortunately, there is an exception to this rule found in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D).  An asylum seeker may apply for asylum beyond the one-year deadline by demonstrating the existence of changed circumstances which materially affect the applicant’s eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing the application.  Further, an applicant seeking waiver of the one-year rule based on changed circumstances must also establish that the application was filed within a reasonable period of time given such changed circumstances. 

Special Rules Cancellation of Removal for Battered Spouses Available to Permanent Residents

Matter of A–M– (BIA 2009)

In this case, the Board of Immigration Appeals considered the question of whether or not a lawful permanent resident is eligible to apply for special rule cancellation of removal for battered spouses.  There are certain aspects of U.S. immigration law which are purely driven by humanitarian considerations.  One of these is the special rule cancellation of removal for persons who are battered, coerced, or abused by their spouses.  Often times, an immigrant who must rely on his or her spouse for sponsorship for immigration status can become a virtual indentured servant to the spouse. The immigrant is put in a precarious position where he or she is at the mercy of the spouse.  Without the spouse’s cooperation in submitting the necessary immigration paperwork, the immigrant would be forced to leave the U.S.  More often than not, the spouse can and will take advantage of this state of imbalance in the couple’s relationship dynamics.  The relationship can turn emotionally or physically abusive, with the threat of removal looming over the immigrant if he or she ever dared to speak up to report or even challenge the abuse.  In effect, the immigrant is forced to endure an abusive relationship because he or she would be unable to leave his or her spouse out of fear of removal.

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